Article in English about the ongoing problems in Tokyo

http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20141203p2a00m0na011000c.html

Slight update

I have placed almost all of the relevant filings and findings for the entire case through all levels of the court system and appeals on a Japanese language blog with brief commentary, that blog being at http://blog.goo.ne.jp/darren918jp

I also interviewed with a law professor whose books and papers helped me pursue the case, and I will post a translation of the first paper that he has written on the case--which should be released this month--as soon as circumstances permit.

There has been a flurry of activity related to this issue in Japan recently, with claims in another case at the district court level also being questionably refused in a city in Okinawa. There is an article in the Mainichi Shimbun from about a year ago on the seriousness of the issue in Tokyo, where it was an issue that some candidates addressed specifically in the recent mayoral election there. You need to sign up for a free account to archive the archived article (only Japanese signup available, and the English article has been deleted from the site), but here is the links to both the English and Japanese versions http://mainichi.jp/shimen/news/20131110ddm003010180000c.html and
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20131111p2a00m0na007000c.html

The title of the original Japanese article is The Childcare Uprising. Groups of up to 30 parents have been filing group petitions objecting to spurious administrative procedures in relation to the admissions process, etc. Tokyo, in particular, has a critical shortage of nursery school capacity at present, whereas it is a right of parents and children to attend nursery school. What we have is a case of passing legislation and not funding what the legislation mandates. 

Since the English language article has been deleted, I will excerpt it below with reference to the above commentary. In English, the article was called:

Doubts surround Abe administration's plans to eliminate childcare waiting lists

The Abe administration has set out to implement preliminary measures toward bringing down the number of children waitlisted for childcare to zero by fiscal 2017, but doubts about the prospects of the measures' success remain.
...

In municipalities across the nation, the application process for spots at authorized childcare facilities starting next spring kicked off this month. In Tokyo's Suginami Ward, which is set to begin accepting applications on Nov. 13, about 100 parents have come into the ward office every day to consult with staff in the childcare division.

After some 1,500 children were denied entry to authorized childcare facilities in Suginami in April this year, parents lodged a formal objection under the Administrative Appeal Act, an act that became known as "the childcare uprising." The uproar spilled over into other parts of Tokyo, as well as the city of Saitama. But the waiting lists have yet to disappear.
...

The number of children waitlisted for childcare services across the country stood at 22,741 as of April 2013. However, the actual figure is estimated to be a digit greater, due to families who give up on their slim chances of getting into authorized childcare facilities and don't bother to apply for a spot.

Municipalities have repeatedly seen a phenomenon in which they increase the number of spots for childcare in the short term, and the number of waitlisted children actually increases because those who didn't apply for spots in other years submit applications, counting on having a better chance....
...the required number of places could increase because the new child-rearing support system that goes into full effect in fiscal 2015 stipulates that parents and guardians who are not currently working but are looking for employment are eligible to put their children in childcare. Previously, the eligibility of those looking for work was unclear...
...
The current lack of childcare services is a consequence of having allocated a mere 4 percent of social welfare spending on child rearing. According to the social welfare and tax reforms passed last year, the consumption tax, which had heretofore been funneled toward geriatric health care, nursing care and pensions, will also be used toward child rearing support.
November 11, 2013(Mainichi Japan)

Ramifications of Supreme Court decision, etc

Before getting into the substance of the title of this post, I should report that in the period since the last post I've managed to file a request for retrial with respect to the supreme court decision from about five years ago that my attorney had decided not to cite in our original petition, as mentioned in earlier posts. there is only a thirty day time limit from the day the supreme court issues a decision to request a retrial--assuming that there is a reason--and considering that they'd handed down the decision on December 24th, just in time for the holiday season, there was very little time.
The retrial will be discussed after the court hands down its decision, but I'll just reiterate now that the supreme court decision that has served as the precedent upon which the retrial was requested relates to Article 24 of the Child Welfare Act. What I'm going to discuss in this post below relates to the clauses of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution.

By refusing to explicitly describe the rationale on the basis of which the court did not recognize our petition to hear the case based on our claims of violations of prior supreme court decision that had become final and binding (at least in the civil law sense of predictability), the Supreme Court has practically gutted Article 5 and Article 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

In the last post (Into the Labyrinth), I introduced the two parallel sets of clauses pertaining to Administrative Dispositions upon Application and Adverse Dispositions, respectively. In this post I’m going to introduce three Articles of the Constitution and briefly discuss some points shared in common by the precedents with respect to which the Supreme Court refused to recognize our claims of violation.

This is by no means--obviously--an exhaustive analysis, as I am not an attorney and the issue of precedents appears to be somewhat contentious, not to mention involved. I've been reading a little about the issues and the topic of 'substantive due process', which seems to be that to which this case is most directly relevant.

First, one of the precedents pertained to an disposition upon application relating to a case in which an individual was applying for a license to operate an “individual taxi” business. In that case, reference was made to Article 22 of the Constitution, which pertains to the freedom to choose one’s occupation. That might sound odd to modern Westerners, but there had been a feudal system in place in Japan for an extended period before the so-called modernization of the late 19^th century, which was actually not so modern(ized) in the socio-political sense. The Article secures a right for the individual in terms of a ‘negative liberty’ against an imposed occupation related to class, family, etc.

Article 22 of the Constitution

Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.

Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

Second, the two other precedents not recognized by the Supreme Court in our case pertained to the reason appended to notification in cases of adverse dispositions related to the sequestering of funds to pay delinquent taxes. All three of the precedents were from prior to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Third, the only high court decision pertaining to Articles 5 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act was the Tokyo High Court decision of 2000. That case related to the denial of an application to sit for the medical exam to become a licensed physician, and reference to Article 22 of the Constitution was made in that case as well. Furthermore, all three of the precedents we cited were also cited in the Tokyo High Court decision of 2000.

What that all means is that in our case, the nursery school system, which is operated by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and has been explicitly revised in recent years in a manner such as to facilitate the diversification of careers and working life-styles of women and to also protect a specific right to choose the nursery school in the letter of the law, has been deemed not to merit protection under Article 13 of the Constitution. In other words, though a young mother basically cannot work unless she can place her child in daycare, and the right to guardians to daycare services has been explicitly provided for by Article 24, the situation in which access to daycare represents the ability to work at all has not been afforded the same level of protection as the right to choose one’s occupation provided for under Article 22 of the Constitution.

Article 13 of the Constitution

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Note that the Constitution of the United States does not even explicitly protect the right to “the pursuit of happiness” as in Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan. There implicit protections of that right through case law and the like, and it is not the case that the Japanese Constitution exceeds the protections afforded to Americans, it just articulates them in a more modern form. The key phrase, again, is “to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare”. This is not intended as a lesson in law, but in the USA today you have so-called “libertarians” advocating for extreme individual rights over and against the government, and that has always been counter to the role of the Constitution in a Constitutional Republic. The Japanese Constitution—which was drafted by Americans—simply articulates that explicitly. Compared to Article 22, there is a question as to the degree of parallelism related to the definition of the right in terms of a negative liberty, as the scope is broader, extending to “the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs”.

The problem is that the Supreme Court of Japan almost never directly recognizes rights as being protected under Article 13, and in our case, the decision was perhaps one of the most resounding denials made by the court in this respect. More detailed analysis will follow in the not-too-distant future.

One other very important point pertains to the relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act to the due process clause of the Japanese Constitution.

Article 31 of the Constitution

No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

There have been cases in which it has been recognized that Article 31 applies to administrative procedures, not only criminal trials. However, the cases in which rights have been recognized as being protected under Article 31 thus far have been limited to cases of adverse dispositions (Articles 12 and 14 of the Administrative Procedure Act). Accordingly, the refusal of the Supreme Court to recognize our claim that the egregious violations of Articles 5 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act are violations of the protection afforded by Article 31 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has in effect promulgated an intention not to enforce the provisions of Articles 5 and 8, which would seem to signal to lower courts that the provisions offer only weak protection, perhaps opened the door to local administrative agencies to violate those clauses with a higher degree of impunity than would seem to be the case at present.

The following consists of a couple of excerpts from the Tokyo High Court decision, which I will translate into English here eventually.

Tokyo High Court decision of H13.6.14

ア 裁量性ある処分に対する司法審査の視点

本件における厚生大臣の裁量は一見広いようにみえるが、憲法上の制約があることを考慮しなければならない。憲法二二条の定める職業選択の自由は、日本人のみに留保されている特殊な職業を除いて、外国人にも保障されているから、外国人といえども怒意的、差別的な理由で職業選択の自由を害されない権利が憲法二二条及び一四条により保障されている。したがって、この点で、厚生大臣の法（医師法）に基づく裁量は、大きく制限されているのである。

個人タクシー事件最高裁判決が、内部的にせよ審査基準を設定しなければならないという、法律の条文にない新たな要請を創造したのは、個人タクシー事業の免許の拒否は個人の職業選択の自由にかかわりを有することが一つの根拠になっていることに留意すべきである。本件も、控訴人の職業選択の自由にかかわっているので、あるから、個人タクシ一事件最高裁判決にならって、行政の裁量に任せずに、それを制約する法創造的な司法活動を行うことが裁判所に期待されるのである。

そこで検討するに、行政手続法は、行政処分、行政指導及び届出に関する手続に関し、共通する事項を定めることによって、行政運営における公正の確保と透明性（行政上の意思決定について、その内容及び過程が国民にとって明らかで、あること）の向上を図り、もって国民の権利利益の保護に資することを目的として制定されたものであり、そのような目的の下に、申請に対する処分については、審査基準の設定・公表（同法五条）、理由の提示（八条）等の規定を、不利益処分については、聴聞あるいは弁明の機会の付与（一三条）、理由の提示（一四条）、文書等の閲覧（一八条）等の規定を置いているのであるから、行政手続法は、その適用を受ける処分について、申請者等に対し、同法の規定する適正な手続によって行政処分を受ける権利を保障したものとするのが相当である。本件においては、既に籾定したとおり、厚生大臣は、本件認定申請を行った控訴人に対し、審査基準を公表せず、また法律上提示すべきものとされている理由を提示することなく本却下処分を行っているところ、このように行政手続上の規定する重要な手続を履践しないで行われた処分は、当該申請が不適法なものであることが一見して明白であるなどの特段の情のある場合を除き、行政手続法に違反した違法な処分として取消しを免れないものというべきである。そして、前記認定に係る本件却下処分に至るまでの経緯に照らすと、本件において前記特段の事情があるとは到底いえないから、厚生大臣の行った本件却下処分は、違法な処分として、取消しを免れない。

    

Into the labyrinth

The point that can be most readily discerned regarding the rationale the Supreme Court adopted in upholding the decision of the Osaka high court with respect to the Supreme Court precedents relates to the matter of “reason appended to notice”.

The decision of the Osaka high court with regard to the reason appended to the notification that our application for admission to the nursery school had been refused states the following.

Osaka High Court decision

～保育所に入所させる申込みに対する福祉事務所長の拒否処分であってその理由は，行政手続法8条所定の理由付記であり，同法14条に規定されている不利益処分の理由の提示とその性質を異にするもので，この処分の性質に照らしても，一定の抽象化した内容となることはやむを得ないものと解される。

～更にその具体的事情まで踏み込んで本件通知書に記載することは，被控訴人の福祉事務所としては困難を伴うものというべきである。

Translation:

…the disposition at issue was a negative disposition pertaining to the application for admission to the nursery school; accordingly, the appended reason at issue pertains to a reason as stipulated under Article 8(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (Disposition upon Application), and not to a reason as stipulated under Article 14 of said Act for appending to a notice of an Adverse Disposition. Because the respective reasons are of different types, and considering the nature of the respective dispositions, it is considered that a certain amount of abstraction in the content of the reason to be appended to a notice of a negative disposition upon application is unavoidable.

…furthermore, when the specifics circumstances relating to the disposition are taken into consideration, it must be said that it there would be difficulty in writing the reason for the administrative agency in charge.  

Problems with the suggested rationale of the Supreme Court 

There are a number of problems with the assertion made by the Osaka High Court, not the least of which is that there is no basis in the statutory law or case precedents for the distinction made between reasons to be appended to notice of disposition. There are other considerations as well, such as the actual state of affairs in other municipalities in Japan, for which we provided specific examples to the court which I will upload for comparison at some point in the not-too-distant future. There is also the fact that this ruling of the Osaka High Court overturned the ruling of the Kyoto District Court that had found the city to be in violation of the law—but not of my rights(?).

Lastly, with regard to Supreme Court precedents, there are only precedents that pertain to cases relating to adverse dispositions, such as the confiscation of funds for unpaid taxes. The only other precedents that pertain to reason appended to notice of disposition upon application are the Tokyo High Court ruling of 2001 and the Osaka District Court ruling of 2002. Both of those decisions made reference to the same Supreme Court precedents (plus other similar precedents) as the two we did. The fact that the Supreme Court has failed to acknowledge the same violation in terms of a misinterpretation of the statute by the Osaka High court means that the decision of the Supreme Court instantiates the Osaka High Court decision as the precedent, indirectly overturning the long-standing Tokyo High Court’s precedent.

The Supreme Court decided to undertake such a course of action without even issuing a formal decision explaining their rationale for overturning the long-standing precedent of the Tokyo High Court.

I will provide related text from the various decisions and translations when I have time, but for now I will just post the English text of the official translation of the two Articles from the Administrative Procedure Act referred to above in the passage quoted from the decision of the Osaka High Court, along with the corresponding Articles on the respective review standards. In comparing them, it is apparent that there is little discernible difference in the wording, and the definition pertaining to the review standards would appear to be somewhat more stringent with regard to dispositions upon application in lieu of the wording "shall establish" as opposed to "shall endeavor to establish". First though, the English translation of the opening Article of said Act.

Administrative Procedure Act

Article 1 (1)

The purpose of this Act is, by providing for common rules concerning procedures for dispositions, administrative guidance and notifications, and procedure for establishing "Administrative Orders, etc", to seek to advance a guarantee of fairness and progress towards transparency (here meaning, that there be clarity in the public understanding of the contents and processes of administrative determinations; the same shall apply in Article 46.) in administrative operations, and thereby to promote the protection of the rights and interests of citizens.

Chapter II Dispositions upon Applications

 (Review Standards)

Article 5 (1) Administrative agencies shall establish review standards.

 (2) Administrative agencies, in establishing review standards, shall make them as concrete as possible in light of the nature of the particular permission, etc.

in question.

 (3) Except in cases of extraordinary administrative inconvenience, administrative agencies shall make review standards available to the public by means of posting them at the office which is, pursuant to laws and regulations, in charge of receiving the subject Applications or by some other appropriate method.

 (Showing of Grounds)

Article 8 (1) Administrative agencies shall, in cases where they render Dispositions refusing the permission, etc. sought by Applications, concurrently show the grounds for the subject Disposition. However, where either the requirements provided by laws and regulations for the permission, etc. or the review standards that have been made available to the public are clearly specified in terms of quantitative indices or other objective indices, and where the fact that an Application does not conform to these requirements or standards can easily be seen from the contents of the written application or from its attached documents, it would be sufficient to show the grounds for the refusal only upon request of the applications.

Chapter III Adverse Dispositions

 (Disposition Standards)

Article 12 (1) Administrative agencies shall endeavor to establish disposition standards, and to make such standards available to the public.

 (2) Administrative agencies, in establishing disposition standards, shall make them as concrete as possible in light of the nature of the particular Adverse Disposition in question.

(Showing of Grounds for Adverse Dispositions)

Article 14 (1) Administrative agencies, in cases where they render Adverse Dispositions, shall concurrently show the ground for the Adverse Disposition to the subject parties. However, this shall not apply when there are pressing needs for rendering Adverse Dispositions without showing their grounds.

As you can see, the following mount of text is substantial, and I have a full-time job as well as a life to lead outside of the actual pursuit of this case and blogging about it, so I don't have time to translate this text at the moment. Note that the following text represents the relevant text from the decisions of the district courts of Kyoto and Osaka, and the high courts of Tokyo and Osaka. I'll add the passages from the Supreme Court precedents we quoted in the petitions later, and create a new post once I've been able to translate the material.

Note that I have also started a blog on this in Japanese, because this case relates to an ongoing public uprising on a small scale across several wards in Tokyo related to similar issues pertaining to the nursery school system. It is important that I provide material to the audience of that blog, because publicity is something that I'm only able to generate online--the news media has basically reused to cover the case after the initial decision.

京都地裁判決の内容

原告の主張

3 理由付記

行政庁は，申請拒否処分を行う場合，申請者に対し，処分の理由を示さなければならない（行政手続法8条1項）。ここに示すべきは，いかなる事実に基づき判断がなされ，公にされた審査基準（同法5条1項）のうちいかなる項目が，いかなる点で充足されていないと判断されたのかが読み取れるものでなければならない。

ところが，本件通知書の「入所希望者が多数のため，選考した結果により，入所できません」という記載からは，御池保育所の入所選考がいかなる事実認定を経てなされたかや，蓮太郎についていかなる審査項目が充足されていれば承諾がされたのか，入所を承諾された児童に比べてどの点が劣っていたのか等について全く知ることができず，本件通知書の理由付記は極めて不十分である。

本件処分は行政手続法8条1項に反している。

4 損害

以上のように，本件処分には児童福祉法又は行政手続法に違反する違法があり，本件処分を行った福祉事務所長には少なくとも過失が認められるというべきである。そして，原告は，それら違法行為により精神的苦痛を被ったのであり，その精神的苦痛を慰籍するための慰籍料としては15 0万円が相当である。

被告の主張

3 理由付記

行政庁に求められる理由付記の程度は，許認可等の性質に照らして個別に判断されると解される。

保育所入所の可否に関する処分において，入所不承諾となった児童のいかなる点が入所承諾がされた児章に比して劣っていたかという点を示すことは，入所承諾がされた児童の家庭の事情を明らかにすることになり，プライバシ一保護の観点から問題があるとともに，行政庁にとって過大な負担となり，不適切である。

他方で，本件通知書の記載からは，入所選考が行われた結果，入所承諾がされた児童と比較して，蓮太郎の保育所入所の優先度が高くなかったという判断がされたことを読み取ることができる。加えて，福祉事務所の担当職員は，本件処分に先立ち，靖子に対し，御池保育所には多数の入所希望者が存在すること，年度途中の入所は受入枠が少ないこと及び靖子の育児休業が平成23年1。

判決の理由

第4 理由付記について

1 行政手続法8条1項本文及び2項は，行政庁が書面によって申請拒否処分を行う場合，同時に，書面により，当該処分の理由を示さなければならないと規定している。この規定は，行政庁の判断を慎重ならしめ，処分の理由を申請者に知らせて不服の申立てに便宜を与える意図の下に置かれたものと解されるから，理由を記載した書面には，行政庁がどのような事実認識に基づき，そのような審査基準へのあてはめをしたのかが分かるような理由を記載しなければならないと解される。

2 ところが，本件通知書の付記された理由は「入所希望者が多数のため，選考した結果により，入所できません」というものにすぎず，この記載からは，どのような事実関係があったため，蓮太郎よりも他の児童の優先度が高かったのかをうかがい知ることができない。このような理由の付記は，行政手続法8条に適うものとはいい難い。

被告は，本件処分に先立ち，B氏が前記第1の3に認定のとおりの説明をしたことをもって，原告は本件処分の理由を具体的に知り得たものと主張するが，処分の理由は書面の記載自体から相手方の知り得るように示さなければならない（昭和60年1月22日最高裁判所第三小法廷判決・民集39巻1号1巻参照）。本件通知書外の事情を掛酌して理由付記が足りているかどうかを判断すべきではない。

確かに，本件の場合のように希望者が17名もいて16名に入所不承諾処分をする場合，通知書への理由の付記が事務処理の負担となることは否めないが，本件取扱要領を公にすることにより，理由の付記も相当程度簡略なものとすることができると考えられるところである。

3 以上のとおり，本件処分は行政手続法8条1項に反して行われたものといわざるを得ないが，理由付記の違法は，直ちに処分の名宛人に具体的な損害を発生させるものではないから，国家賠償請求という手段で間接的にその違法を是正することは困難であって，本来的には，行政不服審査法に基づく裁決又は裁決に対する取消訴訟によってその違法を是正すべきことになる。

もっとも，理由付記の違法によって真実の処分理由を知らされず，処分の名宛人が不服申立ての機会を失ったといった不利益が生じたときは，理由付記の違法によって処分の名宛人に具体的な損害が生じたということができ，この場合，国家賠償誇求によりその損害の賠償を求めることが不可能ではない。

しかしながら，本件の場合，本件処分前にB氏が靖子に対し前記第1の3に認定のとおりの詳しい説明をしているのであって，この説明と本件通知書の記載をあわせると，通常，B氏の説明した理由によって本件処分がされたことは認識が可能となるし，実際にも，原告は，本件処分を不服として審査請求をしているのであって不服申立ての機会を失ったということもないのである。

これらの事情に照らせば，本件処分に係る理由付記の違法は，賠償を要する具体的な損害を原告に発生させたとまではいえない。

したがって，理由付記の違法を原因とする原告の請求は理由がない。

大阪高裁判決の内容

(3）原判決13頁15行目から14頁26行目までを次のとおり改める。

「1 前記認定事実によれば，本件通知書（甲1）に記載された本件処分の理由は，「入所希望者が多数のため，選考した結果により，入所できません。」というもので，この記載のみからは，蓮太郎よりも他の児童の優先度がし、かなる理由で高かったのか，その具体的理由を知ることはできないといわざるを得ない。

2 しかしながら，前記前提事実等及び認定事実によれば，本件処分は，年度途中である平成23年9月から蓮太郎を御池保育所に入所させる申込みに対する福祉事務所長の拒否処分で、あって，その理由は，行政手続法8条所定の理由付記であり，同法14条に規定されている不利益処分の理由の提示とその性質を異にするもので，この処分の性質に照らしても，一定の抽象化した内容となることはやむを得ないものと解される。しかも，本件処分の理由をより具体的に記載するとなると，その性質上，他の児童の具体的な養育状況，各家庭における保護者の勤務状況等のプライバシーに亘る具体的事情との比較が問題とならざるを得ず，各希望者が相当に近くに居住する者であると推測されることに照らしても，更にその具体的事情まで踏み込んで本件通知書に記載することは，被控訴人の福祉事務所としては困難を伴うものというべきである。

3 そして，前記認定事実のとおり，控訴人の入所申込みが，年度途中の，しかも，入所を希望する保育所を御池保育所と限定したもので，更に，担当職員であるB氏とのやりとりからも，靖子及び控訴人としては，上記の諸点を踏まえた上での本件処分の理由は十分に認識可能で、あったと考えられることに照らすと，本件処分の理由付記については，本件通知書の内容が前記の内容で、あったとしても，それは，少なくとも控訴人の権利又は法的に保護すべき利益を侵害する違法なもので、あったとまではいえないと解される。」

上告受理申立埋由の関連主張

2         次に、埋由付記の点について 、 一審判決は記載に不足があるとしたが、原判決は違法性を否定した 。

この点、最高裁判決は、 埋由付記制度の目 的について、「処分の理由を相手方に知らせて不服の申し立てに便宜を 与えるため 」（昭和３８年５月３１日判決民集１７巻４号６１７ペジ）とし、あるいは「処分庁の判断の慎重、合理性を担保してその怒意を抑制するとともに、処分の理由を相手方に知らせて不服申し立ての使宜を与えるためのものであるとしている。

つまり、申請者の自己決定権ないし幸福追求権を、適正手続の保障により実現せんとしたものである。

そのため、要求される付記の内容及び程 度については、「特段の埋由の ないかぎり、いかなる事実関係に基づきいかなる法規を適用して当該処分がされたのかを、処分の相手方においてその記載自 体から了知しうるものでなければならず、単に抽象的に処分の根拠規定を示すだけ では、それによって当該規定の適用の原因となった具体的事実関係をも当然に知りうるような例外の場合を除いては、法の要求する付記として十分でない」（昭和49年4月2日判決民集28巻3号405ペジ）とする。

そして、これらの判例を受けた前記東京高裁判決も、具体性を欠く却下埋由については 、処分を争－う 手掛かり足り得ないゆえに違法としている。このことを前提に本件埋由通知をみるに、その付記内容には何ら具休的な事実関係の記載がなく、処分を争う手掛かりにはなりえない。かかる埋 由通知は、単に行政手続法に反するのみならず、前記審査基準の策定公開 に関して述べたと同様に、憲法13条、31条に反するものであるところ、原判決は 、前記最高裁判例の示した基準に明らかに反し、行政手続法8条にも違反する埋由付記を、適法と断定したものである。

3       したがって、原判決の判示には、最高裁判例違反及び行政手続法8条に関する重大な解釈の誤りがある点、上告受理申立理由が認められる。

Tokyo High Court decision of H13.6.14

ア 裁量性ある処分に対する司法審査の視点

本件における厚生大臣の裁量は一見広いようにみえるが、憲法上の制約があることを考慮しなければならない。憲法二二条の定める職業選択の自由は、日本人のみに留保されている特殊な職業を除いて、外国人にも保障されているから、外国人といえども怒意的、差別的な理由で職業選択の自由を害されない権利が憲法二二条及び一四条により保障されている。したがって、この点で、厚生大臣の法（医師法）に基づく裁量は、大きく制限されているのである。

個人タクシー事件最高裁判決が、内部的にせよ審査基準を設定しなければならないという、法律の条文にない新たな要請を創造したのは、個人タクシー事業の免許の拒否は個人の職業選択の自由にかかわりを有することが一つの根拠になっていることに留意すべきである。本件も、控訴人の職業選択の自由にかかわっているので、あるから、個人タクシ一事件最高裁判決にならって、行政の裁量に任せずに、それを制約する法創造的な司法活動を行うことが裁判所に期待されるのである。

そこで検討するに、行政手続法は、行政処分、行政指導及び届出に関する手続に関し、共通する事項を定めることによって、行政運営における公正の確保と透明性（行政上の意思決定について、その内容及び過程が国民にとって明らかで、あること）の向上を図り、もって国民の権利利益の保護に資することを目的として制定されたものであり、そのような目的の下に、申請に対する処分については、審査基準の設定・公表（同法五条）、理由の提示（八条）等の規定を、不利益処分については、聴聞あるいは弁明の機会の付与（一三条）、理由の提示（一四条）、文書等の閲覧（一八条）等の規定を置いているのであるから、行政手続法は、その適用を受ける処分について、申請者等に対し、同法の規定する適正な手続によって行政処分を受ける権利を保障したものとするのが相当である。本件においては、既に籾定したとおり、厚生大臣は、本件認定申請を行った控訴人に対し、審査基準を公表せず、また法律上提示すべきものとされている理由を提示することなく本却下処分を行っているところ、このように行政手続上の規定する重要な手続を履践しないで行われた処分は、当該申請が不適法なものであることが一見して明白であるなどの特段の情のある場合を除き、行政手続法に違反した違法な処分として取消しを免れないものというべきである。そして、前記認定に係る本件却下処分に至るまでの経緯に照らすと、本件において前記特段の事情があるとは到底いえないから、厚生大臣の行った本件却下処分は、違法な処分として、取消しを免れない。

大阪地裁判決の内容

。。。そして，行政手続法５条１項が，行政庁は申請により求められた許認可等をするかどうかをその法令の定めに従って判断するために必要とされる審査基準を定めることを要求していること，行政手続法８条１項が申請により求められた許認可等を拒否する処分に理由を提示すべきものとしているのは，行政庁の判断を慎重ならしめ，恣意を抑制するとともに，処分の理由を申請者に知らせて不服の申立てに便宜を与える趣旨に出たものであることに照らすと，どのような事実に基づいて判断したのか，審査基準のどの項目がいかなる点で満たされないと判断したのか，どのような法的理由により判断されたのかが示されていなければならないものと解するのが相当である。

　そして，証拠（甲６の１，６の３）によれば，原告Ａら及び原告Ｂらに対して送付された保育所入所保留通知書には，「過日，申込のありました保育所入所措置申請につきましては，４月１日現在保育所の収容能力の関係上入所の見込みがつきがたく，やむを得ず保留措置をとらざるを得ませんので，あしからずご了承ください。」と記載されているにすぎず，原告Ａ３及びＢ３につきいかなる事実認定のもとに判断がなされたのか，どのような審査基準が適用されいかなる審査項目が満たされていないのかが全く不明であり，これをもって行政手続法８条１項にいう当該処分の理由が示されたものと認めることはできない。

また，原告Ｃらについては，原告Ｃらに対して保育所入所保留通知書が送付された事実及び原告Ｃ２が中福祉事務所に対して電話をかけてＣ３の入所の可否を尋ねた際に本件保留処分３を行った理由について説明した事実を認めるに足りる証拠はないから，同項にいう当該処分の理由が示されたものと認めることができないのは明らかである。

したがって，本件各保留処分は，処分の理由を提示することなくなされており，

かつ，全証拠を検討しても行政手続法８条１項ただし書に該当する事由を認めるに足りる証拠はないから，行政手続法８条１項に反し違法であるというべきである。

オ　以上によれば，本件各保留処分は，いずれも行政手続法５条３項，同法１項に反する違法なものであるところ，中福祉事務所長及び東福祉事務所長が上記違法行為をなすにつき過失があったことは明らかである。

Outline of structure of presentation that will follow, and more background

After hearing back from my attorney, I’m again somewhat unsure as to whether a retrial may be possible at some point or not, because the system and evidentiary standards are something I have to examine further. It may be that the term “decision” (or “judgment”, as per the official translation of Article 319 shown below), has a broader scope in this context. That is only one of many considerations. At any rate, since there is a five year period after the decision becomes final to file a suit for a retrial, I will take the time to more thoroughly research the scenario as well as other Supreme Court precedents before considering that option. In the meantime, the time honored civil society bulwark of publicity is to be that to which I make recourse.

Before getting into the substance of the case, I should clarify the formalistic aspects of the petitions filed as they relate to the formalistic aspects of the decision, and the rationale for the order in which the substance of the case will be presented.

In the translation of the Supreme Court decision provided in an earlier post (Cut to the chase), I only provided the gist of the decision (i.e., the reasons given for the decision). The reasons are preceded on the actual document by the statement of the decision, which consists of three short sentences, as follows.

1.    The present appeal is dismissed with prejudice.

2.    The petition for acceptance of final appeal is denied.

3.    The party filing the petition for final appeal and request for final appeal shall bear the respective court costs.

The structure of the decision is relevant to the presentation of the substance of the case because the substance is divided into two categories, according to the respective petitions, as defined by the following clauses from the Civil Procedure Code: 1) “Reasons for Final Appeal”, an 2) “Petition for Acceptance of Final Appeal”.

(Reasons for Final Appeal)

Article 312 (1)

As per “Article 318 (1) and (2)” described in post (Cut to the chase)

(Petition for Acceptance of Final Appeal)

As per “Article 318 (1)” described in post (Cut to the chase)

(Dismissal of Final Appeal with Prejudice on Merits, without Oral Argument)

Article 319 The final appellate court, when it finds that a final appeal is groundless based on the petition for final appeal, statement of reasons for final appeal, written answer or any other documents, may dismiss the final appeal with prejudice on the merits by a judgment, without oral argument.

The most direct approach is to examine the Supreme Court precedents, which the court deemed not to have been contradicted by the decision of the high court  (which incorporates portions of the decision by the district court), with respect to the relevant statutory laws as well as the Constitution. In order to consider the matter defined in Article 318 (2), “The judgment lacks reasons, or the reasons attached to the judgment are inconsistent” the substance of the decisions will have to be explicated, so that will be pursued secondarily, and in conjunction with the presentation of the material pertaining to the precedents where there is overlap.

Before proceeding into the labyrinth, I’ll just say that initially, the case concentrated on violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, and all of the Supreme Court precedents we cited related to two types of such violations. The precedents we cited were also cited directly or indirectly (use of parallel language) in the Tokyo High Court precedent of 2001 and the Osaka District Court decision of 2002.

It bears emphasizing that there the case I brought to the Supreme Court is the first case that pertains to violations relating to an administrative ‘Disposition with Application’. One of the Supreme Court precedents and the Tokyo High Court precedent also pertain to such violations, while the other two Supreme Court precedents pertain to violations related to an administrative ‘Adverse Disposition”, but there is an important point that requires elucidation here.

The Supreme Court precedent all dates from the 1960-70s, before the Administrative Procedure Act was put into effect in 1993. The Tokyo High Court precedent was the first high court trial related to the clauses of the Act pertaining to Dispositions with Application, while the Osaka District Court decision drew on the same Supreme Court precedents as the Tokyo High Court, and was the last such lawsuit filed against such violations because administrative agencies around the country improved their practices. That is evident with respect to our case in relation to the Review Standards from several other cities that we presented as evidence, for example.

Let me put that into perspective. The case I had to bring all the way to the Supreme Court was the first of its kind that had to be brought all the way to the Supreme Court since the 1970s. Because the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1993 was effective, there have been only two notable court cases, i.e., represented by the Tokyo High Court decision and the Osaka District Court decision, since the enactment of said Act, which served to reinforce the rulings from the 1960-70s and stabilize the legal scenario for administrative agencies across the country with respect to administrative procedure.

Furthermore, even though the present mayor of Kyoto had been the head of the Department of Education when the Osaka District Court ruling was handed down, the city of Kyoto did not improve its practices, and the state of affairs against which I filed claims were in some respects even worse than the state of affairs that had been described in the Osaka decision from approximately ten years earlier.